Yesterday I tuned in to CSPAN to watch Washington Mutual execs answer to the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs subcommittee about the failure of Washington Mutual. There are several things I found interesting…former CEO Killinger’s whining about WaMU’s unfair treatment of the banks dissolve and lack of taking any accountability as the leader of the bank for the past 18 years is not one of them. The testimony is very timely as our Congress is looking at financial reform, I hope they pay attention to what is being revealed.
Here are some points I find interesting:
From the Associated Press:
WaMu’s pay system rewarded loan officers for the volume of loans they closed on. Extra bonuses even went to loan officers who overcharged borrowers on their loans or levied stiff penalties for prepayment, according to the report of the Senate panel’s investigation.
“Washington Mutual engaged in lending practices that created a mortgage time bomb,” Levin said. “Because volume and speed were king, loan quality fell by the wayside.” …
In some cases, sales associates in WaMu offices in California fabricated loan documents, cutting and pasting false names on borrowers’ bank statements, the panel found. The company’s own probe in 2005, three years before the bank collapsed, found that two top producing offices – in Downey and Montebello, Calif. – had levels of fraud exceeding 58 percent and 83 percent of the loans. Employees violated the bank’s policies on verifying borrowers’ qualifications and reviewing loans…”
Currently the Federal Reserve is looking at changing how mortgage originators are compensated. They do not want compensation to be based in any part of the terms of the loan (such as the loan amount). This has caused some banks to change to a reward system based on volume (as Washington Mutual did) instead of the merits of each individual loan.
From Senator Levin’s opening statement:
“Washington Mutual and Long Beach compensated their loan officers and processors for loan volume and speed over loan quality. Loan officers were also paid more for overcharging borrowers – obtaining higher interest rates or more points than called for in the loan pricing set out in the bank’s rate sheets – and were paid more for including stiff prepayment penalties…”
The difference between mortgage bankers and mortgage brokers compensation is that mortgage brokers are the only one’s who are required to disclose how they’re compensated on the “back end” (yield spread premium).
James Vanasek, former Chief Credit Officer and Chief Risk Officer seemed relieved to have a chance to tell the subcommittee how his attempts to right Washington Mutual were ignored from management. From his submitted testimony, he feels that Washington Mutuals tagline sent the wrong message to their mortgage originators: the “Power of Yes” absolutely needed to be balanced with “The Wisdom of No.”
“Because of the compensation systems rewarding volume vs quality and the independent structure of the loan originators, I am confident that at times borrowers were coached to fill out applications with overstated incomes or net worth adjusted to meet the minimum underwriting policy requirements. Catching this kind of fraud was difficult at best and required the support of line management. Not surprisingly, Loan originators constantly threatened to quit and go to Countrywide or elsewhere if their loan applications were not approved.”
Washington Mutual was one of the pioneers of the option ARM, offering this product as far back as the 80s (per Killinger’s submitted testimony) I remember back in the 90’s participating with a Washington Mutual loan originator who was presenting the product to a group of investors. This use of this product made more sense than how they (and many others) wound up pushing it.
Our company actually banned this product and I know we lost business by not providing option ARMs if we could not convince the borrower to use a more fixed loan. Account executives from every bank who had an option ARM would be sure to let us mortgage originators know just how much income we were losing. I was (and am) okay with that.
From Senator Levin’s opening statement:
“WaMu was eager to steer borrowers to Option ARMs. Because of the gain from their sale, the loans were profitable for the bank, and because of the compensation incentives, they were profitable for mortgage brokers and loan officers. In 2003, WaMu held focus groups with borrowers, loan officers, and mortgage brokers to determine how to push the product. A 2003 report summarizing the focus group research stated: “Few participants fully understood the Option ARM. … Participants generally chose an Option ARM because it was recommended to them by their Loan Consultant….
To increase Option ARM sales, WaMu increased the compensation paid to employees and outside mortgage brokers for the loans, and allowed borrowers to qualify for the loan [based on a minimum payment]…”
From the LA Times:
Adding to the problems, WaMu and Long Beach Mortgage frequently steered borrowers who qualified for prime loans into subprime loans, the subcommittee found.
This post is all ready too long to discuss Long Beach Mortgage…but I can’t help but share this point I’ve tried making several times about what happened time and time again with Account Executives from banks (not just WaMu) who called on mortgage brokers to push the bank product (from Huffington Post):
“Within Long Beach Mortgage, former employees described how some sales people taught brokers how to break the rules, including using fake and forged documents.”
I’m glad to say I never sent a loan to Long Beach Mortgage and somehow I managed to only send one loan to Washington Mutual (which was an interesting story in its own).
And I would like to say that consumers can feel better about selecting a mortgage originator today, thanks to the SAFE Act, however mortgage originators who work for a depository bank (such as Washington Mutual) are not required to be licensed, they’re only required to be registered (you can thank Congress for that).